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1Distributed Optimal Control of Smart Electricity
Grids with Congestion Management
D. Bao Nguyen, Jacquelien M. A. Scherpen, Senior Member, IEEE, and Frits Bliek
Abstract—In this paper, we consider the balancing problem in
a hierarchical market-based structure for smart energy grids
that is based on the Universal Smart Energy Framework.
The large-scale introduction of renewable, intermittent energy
sources in the power system can create a mismatch between
the forecasted (day-ahead) and the actual supply and demand.
Without a proper control strategy, this deviation could lead to
network overloads and commercial losses. We present a multi-
level distributed optimal control formulation to the problem, in
which the appliances of prosumers that can provide flexibility
are optimally dispatched based on local information. The control
strategy takes the capacity limitations of the distribution network
into account. We provide example simulation results, obtained by
distributed model predictive control.
Note to Practitioners—We propose a control strategy that
aims to minimize the imbalance between forecasted and actual
supply and demand in electricity grids. This is important,
because the imbalance can lead to commercial losses for the
stakeholders. Since the number of agents (i.e., households) in the
power network is typically large, centralized controllers are not
feasible due to scalability issues. We instead develop a distributed
controller that solves the problem using only local information.
We demonstrate our algorithm through simulations, which are
implemented on a single computer. In practice, households can
have smart meters on which the individual controllers run,
thereby obtaining the solution in a parallel fashion.
Index Terms—Optimal control, multi-level distributed control,
smart grid, Universal Smart Energy Framework.
NOMENCLATURE
BRP Balance Responsible Party.
DAP Day-Ahead Planning.
DSO Distribution System Operator.
µCHP Micro Combined Heat and Power.
USEF Universal Smart Energy Framework.
K Total simulation time.
k General time-step.
Kpred Length of prediction (receding) horizon.
κ Time-step within the prediction horizon.
τ Time-steps to fill the heat buffer.
L Heat buffer level.
δ Device on/off indicator (boolean).
F+, F− Ramp-up/ramp-down flexibility.
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P Power consumption/production of device.
η, C Conversion factors.
q Heat demand of prosumer.
ton, toff Number of time-steps a device has been on/off.
T on, T off Bounds on ton/toff (min and max).
A Information sharing matrix.
goali Goal function, the DAP share of prosumer i.
x˜i Real (physical imbalance) of prosumer i.
xi Imbalance information.
z Aggregator index.
N Total number of prosumers.
n Number of prosumers per aggregator.
fi, gi Flexible and fixed load of prosumer i.
Lmax Distribution network capacity limit.
λi, µ Lagrangian multipliers.
β, γ Subgradient iteration step sizes.
ε Subgradient iteration stopping criterion.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENVIRONMENTAL concerns and changes in power usagehave led to the emergence of smart grids. There is a
drive to reduce CO2 emission and to turn towards renewable
energy sources (e.g., solar energy, wind energy, biomass). The
European Union has set targets of (1) reducing greenhouse
gas emission by 20% relative to the 1990 level and (2) each
member state achieving a 20% share of energy consumption
from renewable sources; a policy to be realized by 2020 [1].
However, these energy sources are characterized by intermit-
tency: the production depends heavily on weather conditions.
End-users, who were traditionally consumers, can become
producers too by using, for example, photovoltaic solar panels
or µCHP (micro combined heat and power) devices. They are
henceforth called prosumers.
The need to accommodate fluctuating generation while
avoiding network overloads creates an optimization problem:
what is the optimal way to supply the required power demand,
while compensating at the same time for (short-term) devia-
tions between the forecasted and the actual supply and demand
of power in the system? Since currently there is no economi-
cally efficient way to store electricity in large quantities, these
deviations have to be canceled out to maintain the overall
system balance and make optimal use of the renewable power
generation. To overcome this problem, smart grids exploit
the flexibility of appliances; the combined flexibility of the
network of households can be used to optimize the perfor-
mance of the energy system. The contribution to the balancing
problem from the consumer side is often referred to as demand
2response. Other possibilities include utilizing interacting grids
for storage, for example, Power-to-Gas facilities [2].
A natural way to approach the problem is to use model
predictive control (MPC) [3], as it enables the incorporation of
future, weather-dependent predictions in the decision process.
Examples of MPC application to smart grids include [4], [5],
and [6]. Giselsson and Rantzer [7] suggest a distributed version
of this technique, in which agents make their own decisions
relying only on local information. The distributed formulation
is obtained via dual decomposition and Lagrangian relaxation
[8], [9]. Larsen et al. [10] apply the strategy to control a
network of households with washing machines (flexible con-
sumption). Distributed MPC is then implemented to balance
between heat demand and supply in a network of households
with µCHPs (flexible production) [11]. In both cases, the
households are connected using an information sharing model
that is introduced in [12]. Biegel et al. [13] propose a control
method based on dual decomposition to achieve congestion
management. However, their study is limited to one level of
hierarchy, and only deals with flexible consumption. Various
multi-level distributed MPC schemes, but without congestion
management, are described in [14], [15], and [16]. We aim to
combine all aforementioned efforts into one model.
The main contribution of this work is to build up on [11]
(where only the electricity production is flexible) and [12],
and consider the scenario where the prosumers (households)
have µCHPs and heat pumps, i.e., both flexible production
and flexible consumption is present in the same setting. The
µCHP and heat pump are both connected to heat buffers that
can store heat converted from surplus electricity. Furthermore,
we embed our distributed MPC controller in the Universal
Smart Energy Framework, in which there is also an aggregator
level above the prosumer level, and the two levels are coupled
through a goal function. The objective is to minimize the
prediction error between the forecasted (represented by the
goal function) and the actual supply and demand in the system,
by utilizing the flexible appliances of the households. The
deviation we treat can arise from the forecasting inaccuracies
of both flexible loads (e.g., µCHPs, heat pumps) and fixed
loads (e.g., solar panels, TVs). While doing this, we also take
measures to avoid overloading the distribution network. Our
control method handles two different Lagrange dual variables,
associated with two different type of constraints. The coupling
constraint between the prosumers can be relaxed such that
a distributed formulation among them is obtained, whereas
the DSO constraint requires a central coordinator, resulting in
a multi-level distributed optimization problem. A preliminary
version of this research is reported in [17]. Compared to that
report, here we also describe a method to quantify flexibility,
develop our model to a multiple-aggregator-per-transformer
case, and provide extended simulations. Additionally, we elab-
orate on the simulation results in more detail.
The rest of the document is organized as follows. First,
we introduce the Universal Smart Energy Framework, and
describe our problem within its hierarchical market-based
structure in Section II. Sections III-V develop the distributed
optimal control scheme for the balancing problem. We then
present our implementation for three different scenarios, and
the corresponding result analysis in Section VI. We end with
our conclusions in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
A. Framework
The Universal Smart Energy Framework (USEF) [18] is an
initiative by a collective of top sector companies to standardize
smart grid solutions for the European energy market. Their aim
is to create a platform to drive the fastest, most cost-effective
route to an integrated smart energy future. USEF delivers a
common standard on which to build all smart energy products
and services. It unlocks the value of flexibility by making
it a tradable commodity, and delivering a market structure,
associated rules, and tools to make it work effectively. Flexi-
bility can be invoked for grid capacity management to avoid
or reduce peak loads, and allows for active balancing through
optimization between supply and demand. The framework
is designed to offer fair market access and benefits to the
stakeholders, and is accessible to anyone internationally.
In this study, we treat the following USEF stakeholders:
the Balance Responsible Party (BRP), aggregators, prosumers,
and the Distribution System Operator (DSO). Electricity is
traded between the suppliers and the BRPs over the wholesale
energy market (day-ahead) and imbalance market (operation
time). The BRPs dispatch the electricity to the aggregators,
which in turn deliver to the prosumers. The aggregator is a
new stakeholder in energy grids that groups the prosumers
into clusters. Its responsibility is to accumulate and offer
flexibility on behalf of the connected prosumers, with the aim
of maximizing the value of flexibility. The DSO is responsible
for the distribution of power and to resolve any disturbances
that might interfere with that task. In this context, the main
task of the DSO is to detect and resolve any congestion that
might occur in the distribution lines.
USEF employs a market-based control mechanism which
consists of five phases: contract, plan, validate, operate, and
settlement. Contractual agreements between the stakeholders
are established in the first phase. In the plan phase, a day-ahead
forecast of the energy consumption is made, which is then
validated by the DSO in the validate phase. The two phases
are iterated until an agreement is reached on the forecast. In
the operate phase the system aims to follow the plan that has
been created in the first two phases, and balances between
the forecast and actual electricity load by procuring flexibility.
Financial reconciliation is completed in the settlement phase.
An overview of the USEF structure and market-based control
mechanism is shown in Fig. 1. Parts that are not relevant to
this research are omitted from the figure, for full details, see
[18].
B. Problem statement
The work presented here is focusing on the operate phase
of USEF, with a layout as seen in Fig. 2. Note, that compared
to [17], we now look into the case where multiple aggregators
are constrained by the same distribution network capacity limit




























































these settings may influence the flexibility these appliances 
and assets can provide to the Aggregator.
BRP and Supplier (N-to-M)
The Supplier has a contract with the BRP that defines 
the commercial terms under which the BRP sources 
the energy demand and supply of the Prosumers under 
contract with the Supplier. This contract, which is already 
in place in the current liberalized energy market, is not 
affected by USEF.
BRP and Aggregator (N-to-M)
The Aggregator and BRP negotiate how to mutually 
optimize their portfolios and identify the lowest operational 
costs. Flexibility is traded according to the MCM. Although 
in general an Aggregator can interact with multiple BRPs, 
an Aggregator can only interact with a single BRP for any 
given connection. This BRP must be the same BRP that 
provides energy to the Supplier with whom the Aggregator 
has a framework agreement for that connection.
BRP and Producer (N-to-M)
Based on its portfolio optimization, the BRP determines the 
most economical way to balance its portfolio. This process 
determines how much energy each power plant should 
produce in the upcoming period. The BRP orders the 
Producer to dispatch that amount of energy in the upcoming 
period or purchases it on the market. In the Operate phase 
(see chapter 8), the BRP can ask the Producer to alter its 
production plan. This process, which is already in place in the 
current liberalized energy market, is not affected by USEF.
TSO and BRP (1-to-N)15
The TSO validates whether the energy transport planned 
by all the BRPs (in their E-programs) can be executed 
reliably and safely. The TSO continuously monitors network 
conditions and, when imbalances arise, buys regulating 
power from the BRPs to balance the system.
Figure 10: The USEF interaction model, including the most important contractual relationships.
13 Although third parties can serve as energy resellers under the auspices 
of the Supplier’s supply permit, the responsibilities remain with the Supplier.
14 The reasoning behind this is that commodity and flexibility are inherently linked 
to one another, and hence also the settlement of commodity and flexibility.
This becomes even more apparent when time-of-use tariffs are applied.
15 Assuming there is only one TSO active in the country. If multiple TSOs 
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Fig. 1. The hierarchical organization of USEF, and main i teractions between its stakeholders. The day-ahead planning is made by the BRP and aggregators,
which is then validated by the DSO. In the operate phase, the system a s to follow the day-ahead planning as close as possible.
We assume that the electricity portfolio has already been
forecas d and agreed n b the aggr g ors, BRP, d DSO
(i.e., it is free of c ng stion). This e c ricity ortfoli is
referred o as the day-ah ad l n ing. Give prosumer heat
emands, the goal is to f lfill that d m nd while ke pi g the
elec r city lo d s close to the day-ah ad plan ing as possible
(i.e., minimize the predicti n r r). F r simplicity, e s um
th t each p s mer is quipp d it e ppli nc , ei h
µCHP (r pres nti lec ricity pr du on) r a at um
(representin el c ric ty c sumptio ), see Fig. 3. Th m thod
described in t is paper is al a icabl t he case wh e
prosumer can have ultipl fl x l d v ces, for xa ple, by
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Fig. 2. Our model considers the three-level structure within the informational
n tw rk, as well as the connections to the distribution lines in the physical
network. LV, MV, and HV stand for l w voltage, me ium v tag , and igh
voltage n tworks, respectively.
We prop se a hierarchical, three-level structure (BRP, ag-
gr g to s, prosu ers), in which the day-ahead planning is
s read ov r ggrega or , and subsequently the prosumers
connected to them, b s on the available flexibility of the
r su ers. At th l v l f the prosum rs, th minimization
of the predictio error in the operate phase is solved in
distribut d man r, wher each prosumer contributes to
th optimizati pr ces bas d onl on local information
exchange with their neig bors. In [19], whi h co siders a
similar dist buted MPC framework, although not in a market-
based structure, it has been shown that the more information
t p o u ers s are with each ot er, th less imbalance there is
in th etw rk. The role of th DSO is in luded in the model
to avoid viol tion of the distribution network capacities. To
stee the fl xibl appliances of the prosumers, a goal function



















Fig. 3. Illustrative scheme of a prosumer with fixed and flexible loads (either
µCHP or heat pump). An example device for each category is given.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper, we use the convention of assigning a
negative sign to electricity production (supply), and a positive
sign to consumption (demand). The total load of a household
is the signed sum of the two quantities. We use the terms
“appliance” and “device” interchangebly.
A. Quantification of flexibility
In our model, flexibility is regarded as the ability to shift
the production or consumption of appliances in time, without
changing the total energy production or consumption. By
utilizing the flexibility of the devices (i.e., turning on/off
devices based on the load measured in the network), demand
side management can be performed. We describe a method
4to quantify the flexibility a thermal appliance can offer at a
given time, based on [20]. The flexibility of the µCHP and heat
pump, both in combination with a heat buffer, can be measured
as the potential power increase or decrease with respect to a
baseline (i.e., current) power production or consumption. By
doing so, two scenarios can be distinguished:
• ramp-up flexibility: increasing the electricity consumption
of the household by turning off the µCHP or turning on
the heat pump,
• ramp-down flexibility: decreasing the electricity con-
sumption of the household by turning on the µCHP or
turning off the heat pump.
We assume that the water level of the buffer remains
constant, and only the heat content is changing. The buffer
fills according to







, 0 ≤ L[τ ] ≤ 1 , (1)
where L[τ ] is the generalized buffer level after τ time-steps,
L0 is the initial buffer level, η is a ratio between electric and
thermal power, C is a conversion factor from thermal power
to the buffer level, and P is the power produced (in case of a
µCHP) or consumed (in case of a heat pump) while filling the
buffer. The household has a heat demand q[τ ], with which the
buffer is drained. Parameters η, C, and P may vary for the
µCHPs and heat pumps, we denote their specific parameters
with subscripts C and H , respectively.
From Eq. (1) we can derive the remaining available electri-







Taking the power limits into account, the ramp-up and ramp-
down flexibilities of the µCHP can be then given by the
following expressions:









F−C [τ ] = max
{








where δ is a boolean variable indicating whether the appliance
is running at τ = 0:
δ =
{
1 if the appliance is operating,
0 if the appliance is not operating.
(5)
Note, that in order for the µCHP to have ramp-up flexibility
(i.e., to increase the power consumption of the household), the
appliance must be running and has to be turned off. Vice versa,
in order for it to have ramp-down flexibility, the appliance
must be idle and has to be turned on. After the buffer is full,
the µCHP can no longer operate. This gives an upper limit
to the duration for which the appliance can be running, and
thus for the available ramp-down flexibility. When the buffer is
drained, the appliance can no longer remain idle, and thereby
provides an upper limit to the available ramp-up flexibility.
The same analogy holds with respect to the flexibility of the
heat pump. An idle heat pump has to be turned on to provide
ramp-up flexibility, whereas a running heat pump has to be
turned off to provide ramp-down flexibility. These flexibilities
are expressed as:
F+H [τ ] = min
{


















We give a brief review on the optimal control problem of
a network of n agents in this section. We first outline the
centralized problem, followed by the equivalent distributed
formulation. The section is based on [7], [11], and [12].
The network is represented by a weighted, directed graph
G = (Vn, En), with Vn = {1, 2, . . . , n} being the set of agents
and En ⊆ Vn × Vn being the set of edges. The agents are
connected in order to exchange information, (i, j) ∈ En means
that agent i receives information from agent j. The weight on
the edge characterizes the importance of the information.
Now consider the discrete-time system
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] +Bu[k] + w[k] , (8)
where x[k] ∈ X ⊆ Rn is the state, u[k] ∈ U ⊆ Rn is the
input, and w[k] ∈ W ⊆ Rn is the disturbance vector at time-
step k. Note, that k is the general time-step throughout the
paper, while τ is used to distinguish the number of time-steps
it takes to fill the heat buffer from its initial level. X , U ,
and W are bounding sets. Matrix A ∈ Rn×n is the weighted
adjacency matrix corresponding to G with properties
• Aij ≥ 0,




Furthermore, G is required to be strongly connected. An
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Fig. 4. Example information sharing topology between agents. Note, that
there is no DSO-like coordinator included in the graph.
5We assume that input matrix B is the n×n identity matrix,
B = In. The objective is to find a sequence of control
inputs that minimizes a given quadratic performance index
V (x[k], u[k]) over K time-steps. We assume this performance
index to be separable for the agents, i.e., V (x[k], u[k]) =∑






subject to Eq. (8)
(10)
is a centralized problem, in the sense that a central entity
collects all relevant information to compute the solution.
The main disadvantage of this formulation is that it quickly
becomes computationally expensive as we scale the number
of agents. Hence, we instead split the problem into smaller
sub-problems. The idea is that each agent solves its own sub-
problem, based only on local information, and together they
arrive to the solution of the original problem. This technique
is called dual decomposition.
Let AD be the matrix of self-weights, AD =
diag(a11, a22, . . . , ann), and A0 = A − AD. We introduce
a new variable v[k] so that (8) can be rewritten as
x[k + 1] = ADx[k] + v[k] + u[k] + w[k] , (11)
with the additional constraint
v[k] = A0x[k] . (12)
We then decompose the problem by applying Lagrangian
relaxation, i.e., we augment the objective function with con-
straint (12), weighted by the vector of Lagrange multipliers







V (x[k], u[k]) + λ[k]T (v[k]−A0x[k]) . (13)
Since V (x[k], u[k]) is separable, we can decouple this ob-
jective function by interchanging the minimization and sum-
mation terms. Thus, each prosumer solves its own separated












The new formulation is often referred to as the dual prob-
lem, with λ[k] being the dual variables vector. The solution
to the dual problem is the same as the solution to the
original problem, if the bounding sets X , U , and the objective
function V (x[k], u[k]) are convex [8]. The Lagrange multiplier
is calculated using a subgradient iteration [7], which we will
describe in the next section.
IV. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. Device modeling
Here, we describe the models of the µCHPs and heat pumps
used in this paper. The devices have flexible loads (fi[k]), and
are modeled as mixed logical dynamical (MLD) systems [21].
Running on fossil fuel, the µCHP is generating both elec-
tricity and heat simultaneously. The amount of electricity
produced is assumed to be a constant value PC ,
fi[k] =
{
0 if δi[k] = 0,
PC if δi[k] = 1,
(15)
where δi[k] is the generalization of (5) for prosumer (and
appliance) i at time-step k. The ratio between the produced
electricity and heat is ηC .
When the heat pump is operating, it converts electricity into
heat with conversion ratio ηH . The electricity consumption




0 if δi[k] = 0,
PH if δi[k] = 1.
(16)
In both cases, the generated heat is stored in a heat buffer.
The buffer storage level decreases if there is a heat demand
in the household, this amount is denoted by q[k]. Hence, the
storage level can be expressed as
Li[k + 1] = Li[k] +
η
C
|fi[k]| − q[k + 1]
C
, (17)
also see Section III-A. The value of η is dependent on the
type of device.
For efficiency reasons, an appliance is required to keep
operating for at least T onmin time-steps once it had been turned
on. Correspondingly, it is required to stay switched off for
at least T offmin time-steps before it can run again. We define
counters toni [k] and t
off
i [k] to keep track of the number of time-
steps the device is in a given state:
toni [k + 1] =
{




toffi [k + 1] =
{
toffi [k] + 1 if δi[k + 1] = 0,
0 otherwise.
(19)
The bounds on the operating times are thus written as
T onmin ≤ toni [k] ≤ T onmax , T offmax ≤ toffi [k] ≤ T offmax . (20)
These dynamical constraints, which contain boolean vari-
ables, can be translated into a set of linear inequality con-
straints, as has been described in [21]. However, with the
introduction of the boolean variables, the problem becomes a
mixed-integer programming problem, and we lose convexity.
The dual gap [8] between the primal and the dual problem is no
longer zero. Excess switching between the binary values might
happen, therefore we set a maximum number of switches to
ensure convergence.
B. Aggregator level
According to the USEF market-based control mechanism, a
day-ahead planning (DAP[k]) is made in the plan and validate
phases. This is the electricity portfolio the BRP promises
to deliver during the operate phase. The actual delivered
electricity might deviate from the day-ahead planning due
6to unforeseen events, and the objective of our system is to
compensate for this deviation.
First, the day-ahead planning is divided among the aggrega-
tors, based on the available flexibility they have. At every time-
step, the aggregators receive flexibility information (Section
III-A) from their connected prosumers, and accumulate them









F−i [k] , (21)
where i = 1, . . . , n are the prosumers connected to aggregator
z. We assume that the number of prosumers are the same for
all aggregators. Note, that since we only consider a single
appliance per prosumer, we use the same indices for the
appliances and the prosumers.
The more flexibility an aggregator has, the bigger share of
the day-ahead planning it will receive, so that it contributes
more to the balancing problem. Ramp-up flexibility is needed
when the electricity demand is lower than the day-ahead
planning. In this case, each aggregator receives a day-ahead






DAP[k] for all z. (22)
Similarly, when the electicity demand is higher than the day-
ahead planning, ramp-down flexibility is procured. The share






DAP[k] for all z. (23)
The day-ahead planning of each aggregator can be in turn
spread among the prosumers based on their available flexibility
or evenly. How it was divided did not make much difference
in our simulations [22]. For this study, we choose to divide




for all i. (24)
The goal function acts as a reference value for the prosumers
during their optimization process.
C. Prosumer level
Here, we describe the optimal control problem within one
aggregator. We think of the prosumers as agents, and use the
following notation:
• fi[k]: flexible (controllable) load of prosumer i,
• gi[k]: fixed (uncontrollable) load of prosumer i.
Electricity load is the sum of supply (production) and
demand (consumption), with the convention of using negative
sign for supply and positive for demand. The prediction error
between the forecasted and actual electricity load is expressed
by
x˜i[k] = fi[k] + gi[k]− goali[k] , (25)
or
x˜i[k + 1] = x˜i[k] + ui[k] + wi[k]−∆goali[k] , (26)
where
ui[k] = fi[k + 1]− fi[k] ,
wi[k] = gi[k + 1]− gi[k] ,
∆goali[k] = goali[k + 1]− goali[k] .
(27)
By introducing the information sharing matrix A, we pro-
vide coupling between the prosumers:




+ ui[k] + wi[k]−∆goali[k] .
(28)
The requirements on the A matrix (see Section III-B) ensure







The difference is that x˜i[k] denotes the real, physical imbal-
ance of prosumer i, whereas xi[k] is the imbalance information
that includes the weighted sum of the neighboring imbalances
as well.
1) Distributed optimal control problem: We want to mini-
mize the deviation (error) between the predicted and the actual













+ ui[k] + wi[k]−∆goali[k] ,
device-specific constraints from Sec. IV-A.
(30)
Note, that the device-specific constraints contain the integer
(boolean) variable δ. In order to obtain the distributed for-
mulation, we decompose the centralized problem by applying
(11)-(12):
xi[k+1] = Aiixi[k]+vi[k]+ui[k]+wi[k]−∆goali[k] , (31)
where vi[k] =
∑
j 6=iAijxj [k] is the expected influence of
the connected neighbors. The dual objective function that the












2) Congestion management: The DSO makes sure that the
network is not overloaded. In this paper, we assume that all
prosumers (N ) are under one DSO. The total (flexible plus
fixed) load of all households should stay within the distribution
capacities of the entire network:
N∑
i=1
(fi[k] + gi[k]) ≤ Lmax for all k, (33)
where Lmax is the maximum network (or transformer) capacity,
and is assumed to be constant. The objective function is further
augmented with this DSO constraint via Lagrangian relaxation















+ µ[k]fi[k] + µ[k]gi[k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DSO constraint
. (34)
The Lagrange multipliers λi[k] and µ[k] ≥ 0 are generally
associated with shadow prices [23], and are updated through
the subgradient iterations
λr+1i [k] = λ
r










µr+1[k] = µr[k] + γr
(∑
i
(fi[k] + gi[k])− Lmax
)
, (36)
where r is the iteration counter, and β and γ are appropri-
ately chosen step sizes. In practice, the subgradient iteration
is stopped when a sufficiently good approximation of the
solution is reached. A stopping criterion is given in [7]; the
algorithm terminates if the Lagrangian updates stay within a
certain ε bound. Note, that λi[k] are distributed, “prosumer-
specific” Lagrange multipliers, whereas µ is a centralized,
“grid operator-specific” one. The shadow prices can be in-
terpreted as monetary rewards that the prosumers receive as
incentives to modify their loads.
Model predictive control [3] is well-known for its efficient
and systematic ability to handle constraints and real-time
changes of the parameters. It fits well within our setup, thus
we choose to solve the optimal control problem with MPC,
at the cost of having a suboptimal solution. This is because
the method uses a finite, receding horizon instead of the infi-
nite horizon of the original optimization problem. The MPC
scheme that solves the distributed optimal control problem is
called distributed MPC (d-MPC). For the performance analysis
of the d-MPC approach, we refer to [7], [11], and also [24]
for numerical simulations.
V. ALGORITHM
The algorithmic description of our distributed MPC scheme
is shown below, with κ = k, . . . , k+Kpred being the prediction
time-step within the receding horizon Kpred. The hat notation
indicates the predicted values. For clarity, we only describe the
algorithm for one aggregator network. All aggregators perform
the same optimization loop.
In this algorithm, the DSO monitors for congestion points
at every iteration step, after all aggregators have performed
the iteration. The following cases can happen:
• If there is congestion detected by the DSO, all aggrega-
tors have to perform the optimization loop again. The
DSO, acting as the central coordinator for congestion
management, sends out the µ[k] shadow price to all
prosumers in order to incite different load productions
and consumptions.
1 for k ← 0 to K − 1 do
2 each prosumer i measures xi[k], wi[k];
3 xˆi[κ]|κ=k = xi[k], wˆi[κ]|κ=k = wi[k];
4 initialize λˆi[κ], µˆ[κ], and ε;
5 while |λˆri [κ]− λˆr−1i [κ]| > ε (∀i) or
|µˆr[κ]− µˆr−1[κ]| > ε do
6 for i← 1 to n do
7 solve (34);
8 end
9 each pros. i sends {xˆi[κ]}k+Kpredκ=k to neighbors;
10 for i← 1 to n do
11 subgradient update (35);
12 end
13 each pros. i sends {λˆi[κ]}k+Kpredκ=k to neighbors;
14 subgradient update (36);
15 each pros. i receives {µˆ[κ]}k+Kpredκ=k from DSO;
16 end
17 each prosumer i implements ui[k] = uˆi[κ]|κ=k
18 end
• If there are no congestion points detected by the DSO,
but the λi[k] Lagrange-multipliers have not converged
yet, then all aggregators have to perform the optimization
loop.
• If there are no congestion points detected, and some, but
not all of the λi[k] values have converged, then only those
aggregators have to perform the optimization loop again
whose corresponding λi[k] have not converged.
Note, that in this model the number of prosumers is n for all
aggregators, and there is no coupling between prosumers that
belong to different aggregators. Using dual decomposition, a
multi-level distributed optimization formulation is obtained for
the prosumers, who act individually based on local information
received from their neighbors. The aggregators only send out
the goal functions at the beginning of each optimization loop,
they do not act during the process.
VI. SIMULATIONS
A. Implementation
We implement our controller in three different scenarios, as
explained in Sec. VI-B below. We use MATLAB in combi-
nation with Gurobi [25] to solve the mixed-integer quadratic
programs (MIQP). A circular topology is considered for the
prosumers within an aggregator cluster, with each prosumer
having a self-weight of 0.6, and a weight of 0.2 for the
information coming from its two neighbors. The corresponding
information sharing matrix is
A =

0.6 0.2 0 . . . 0 0.2
0.2 0.6 0.2 . . . 0 0







0.2 0 0 . . . 0.2 0.6
 . (37)
We work with realistic load profiles acquired from pattern
generators from the Energy research Centre of the Netherlands
(ECN) [26]. Setup parameters for the appliances are derived
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Fixed load Pr. #1 (HP) Pr. #3 (HP) Pr. #5 (HP) Pr. #2 (mCHP) Pr. #4 (mCHP) Pr. #6 (mCHP)
Fig. 5. (Scenario 1) Simulation 1, without congestion management. The upper figure illustrates the total load within the prosumer network, the lower
figure depicts the flexible and fixed loads in detail. The system aims to follow the forecasted day-ahead planning, the mismatch is shown as the green line.
The network capacity limit is violated several times.
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Fixed load Pr. #1 (HP) Pr. #3 (HP) Pr. #5 (HP) Pr. #2 (mCHP) Pr. #4 (mCHP) Pr. #6 (mCHP)
Fig. 6. (Scenario 1) Simulation 2, with congestion management. All of the DSO constraint violations are resolved by shifting the production and consumption
of the flexible devices in time.
from the devices installed in PowerMatching City, a smart
grid demonstration project in the Netherlands [27]. Table I
summarizes these parameters. We initialize all Lagrangian
multipliers with zero. ε, the subgradient convergence criterion
for both multipliers, is chosen to be 0.04.
T onmax and T
off
max are determined by the physical limits of the
heat storage buffers attached to the devices: if the heat buffer is
empty, the appliance has to turn on, and if the buffer is full, the
appliance has to stop operating. In the simulation, one time-
step corresponds to 15 minutes, and the prediction horizon
for the d-MPC is taken to be 8 time-steps. The buffer levels
are arbitrarily initialized. The non-summable diminishing step




r. Different γ0 choices have been tested in
[28], for our simulations, we have chosen γ0 = 1.
For demonstration purposes, we set the network capacity
limit to a value that is lower than the standard level (i.e.,
an approximate 1.1 kW per household). This is to better
see the effects the flexible appliances can have in resolving
congestion within the distribution network. In certain cases
in our demonstration simulations, the DSO constraint is lower
than the day-ahead planning. In these situations, the day-ahead
planning is shaved because of the USEF requirement, that the
DAP has to be valid (i.e., congestion free).
B. Results
1) Scenario 1: In this scenario, the network consists of
6 households, each with one appliance: 3 are equipped with
µCHPs, 3 with heat pumps, and are connected in an alternating
order.
9TABLE I
DEVICE PARAMETERS USED FOR THE SIMULATIONS
µCHP heat pump
P [kW] -1.0 1.1
η [MJ/kW] 5.4 2.7
C [MJ] 22.6 12.6
T onmin [time-steps] 2 2
T offmin [time-steps] 2 2


















Pros. #3 (heat pump)


















Pros. #3 (heat pump)
Fig. 7. Heat buffer levels of Prosumers #2 and #3 in the two simulations.















µ λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6
Fig. 8. Evolution of the shadow prices at time-step 8.
In Simulation 1 (Fig. 5), the DSO constraint is ignored.
The figure depicts the total electricity load of the network
over the simulation period, as well as the individual loads
of the prosumers. Note, that the local production from the
µCHPs lower the total load. The network capacity limitation
is violated at time-steps 10-12, 24, and 47-48. The difference
between the forecasted and the actual load (over the whole
simulation period) is kept as low as possible.
In Simulation 2, we apply congestion management to the
system (Fig. 6). Three different ways of resolving congestion
are observed:
• In time-steps 10-11, the µCHP of Prosumer #2 is shifted
backwards in time (from time-steps 13-15), in order to
lower the high fixed load. Only two of the initial three
instances of operation can be shifted due to its buffer
capacity limits (Fig. 7). Congestions caused by fixed
electricity loads can only be resolved by turning on
µCHPs. In time-step 24, the two µCHPs were not able
to bring the total load under the network capacity limit,
therefore the third µCHP is kept operating at that time-
step. The total production of the three µCHPs together is
enough to resolve the congestion.
• In time-step 12, the consumption of the heat pump of
Prosumer #5 is moved away to time-steps 6-7, in order
to avoid congestion.
• In time-steps 47-48, the heat pumps cannot be moved
away because of the high heat demands of the respective
prosumers, but the congestion can be resolved by µCHPs.
The electricity production of the µCHPs compensate for
the consumption of the heat pumps.
Congestion can be resolved by moving µCHPs to the time of
violation, or by moving heat pumps away from those instances.
If we look at the buffer levels (Fig. 7), we notice that
because the µCHP of Prosumer #2 is only running for two
time-steps in Simulation 2 instead of three, the heat demand
drains its buffer enough for the device to be able to operate
for a longer duration from time-step 20 onwards. This helps to
resolve the network capacity violation at time-step 24. Another
observation is that at time-step 33, the heat buffer of Prosumer
#3 is turned on, although the day-ahead planning is low. This
is due to the fact that its heat buffer is empty, therefore the heat
pump must turn on regardless of the predicted load. Moreover,
notice that in Simulation 2 (with DSO constraint), Prosumer
#2 makes more use of the maximum storage capacity of the
heat buffer, thereby providing more ramp-down flexibility to
resolve congestion.
Fig. 8 shows the evolution of λ1, ..., λ6, and µ at time-
step 8, when congestion is detected within the prediction
horizon of the d-MPC. The shadow price µ keeps oscillating
between updating positively when a congestion is detected,
and updating negatively when there is no congestion detected
until the λis are converged. It ensures that all congestion in
the prediction horizon is prevented, and indirectly reflects the
price the DSO has to pay to the prosumers during the USEF
settlement phase, to compensate for their modified behavior.
2) Scenario 2: In the second scenario, we run the simu-
lations with 1,000 prosumers to show that the algorithm is
capable to handle larger networks.
In Simulation 1 (Fig. 9), the DSO constraint is violated,
which is then solved in Simulation 2 (Fig. 10). We can observe
that at those time-steps where there is congestion in Simulation
1, more µCHP devices are turned on in Simulation 2 to
decrease the total load of the network, and hence resolving
the congestion.
The running time of the simulation does not scale linearly
with the number of prosumers. This is due to the fact that al-
though the algorithm is distributed, the simulation itself is not
implemented in a parallel fashion. In reality, we envision that
10
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Fixed load Heat pumps mCHPs
Fig. 9. (Scenario 2) Simulation 1, without congestion management. In this scenario, 1,000 prosumers are present within 1 aggregator. There are congestions
points which need to be resolved.
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Fixed load Heat pumps mCHPs
Fig. 10. (Scenario 2) Simulation 2, with congestion management.
each prosumer will have a smart meter or computer in their
homes, and the calculations can be done in parallel. Only the
DSO has to collect the information about the prosumer loads,
the prosumers only work with local information from their
neighbors. Therefore, that part of the algorithm is scalable.
3) Scenario 3: Scenario 3 presents the hierarchical control
case, where multiple aggregators are involved. In this scenario,
2 aggregators, with 50 prosumers each, are considered. The
distribution line capacity limitation is again violated in Sim-
ulation 1 (Fig. 11). In Simulation 2 (Fig. 12), the algorithm
solves the congestion points by proportionally distributing the
day-ahead planning among the two aggregators, based on their
available flexibility. Both aggregators (and their prosumers)
contribute to congestion management, which can be seen from
the sub-division of the prediction error between the aggrega-
tors: in Simulation 1, the total prediction error (the objective
TABLE II
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ITERATIONS
Scenario 1, Simulation 1 144
Scenario 1, Simulation 2 400
Scenario 2, Simulation 1 159
Scenario 2, Simulation 2 330
Scenario 3, Simulation 1 161, 150 (two aggregators)
Scenario 3, Simulation 2 177, 178 (two aggregators)
function) is 389.98 kW2 and 372.65 kW2, respectively, on the
two aggregators. In Simulation 2, the total prediction error on
each aggregator is 408.21 kW2 and 411.11 kW2. In the latter
simulation, the additional constraint on the distribution line
capacities makes the problem tighter, and thus increases the
value of the objective function.
Table II summarizes the maximum number of convergence
11
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Fixed load Aggr. #1 (heat pump) Aggr. #2 (heat pump) Aggr. #1 (mCHP) Aggr. #2 (mCHP)
Fig. 11. (Scenario 3) Simulation 1, without congestion management. In this scenario, 2 aggregators, with 50 prosumers each, is considered. The distribution
line capacity limitation is again violated.
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Fixed load Aggr. #1 (heat pump) Aggr. #2 (heat pump) Aggr. #1 (mCHP) Aggr. #2 (mCHP)
Fig. 12. (Scenario 3) Simulation 2, with congestion management.
iterations for each scenario. It is notable that the second sim-
ulations (with congestion management) take a higher number
of iterations to converge. This is expected, as the limitations
on the distribution lines add another constraint to the problem,
making it more difficult to solve.
VII. CONCLUSION
We formulate an optimal control problem with the goal of
minimizing the error of prediction for supply and demand in
a USEF-compliant network. In its hierarchical structure, we
quantify flexibility in order to divide the day-ahead planning
among the aggregators, and then develop a distributed model
predictive controller to achieve our objective. The prosumers
share local information with each other, thus reach the solution
in a cooperative manner. The goal function, derived from the
day-ahead planning, provides the link between the different
phases of the USEF market-based mechanism. We demonstrate
in various simulation scenarios that our model succesfully
avoids congestion by procuring flexibility from the smart
appliances, while keeping the prediction error to a minimum.
There is ongoing work to expand the scope of the model and
add optimization to the upper levels (BRP and aggregator) as
well, thereby obtaining a multi-level optimal control problem.
We aim to take different objectives on the different levels,
i.e., the stakeholders can optimize towards their own interests.
One possible way in this direction is to incorporate a pricing
mechanism.
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